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5 key points panel  
· The tobacco industry’s future depends on increasing tobacco use in low and 
middle income countries (LMICs), especially among women and youth and contrary 
to industry claims, tobacco marketing deliberately targets these groups. High levels 
of marketing are documented in LMICs. 
· Tobacco companies consistently contest and seek to circumvent governments’ 
authority to implement public health measures using highly misleading arguments 
frequently presented via third parties whose links to industry are obscured.  
· In LMICs, tobacco companies harness their resource advantages in establishing 
partnerships with governments to address the trade in illicit tobacco in which there 
is evidence of their complicity and in using the threat of domestic litigation and 
arbitration under economic agreements (rarely drawing on the original intent of 
these agreements) to intimidate governments against comprehensive tobacco 
control measures. 
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· Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and its guidelines 
offer governments a set of strategies to protect public health against the tobacco 
industry’s appalling conduct, but are underutilised.  
· An essential first step in addressing tobacco industry interference is changing 
attitudes to the industry through actively monitoring and exposing its conduct. 
Exemplar countries show that such efforts underpin the development of effective 
tobacco control. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The inexorable rise in global deaths from tobacco is increasingly driven by trends in low and 
middle income countries (LMICs)1 where, by 2030, it is estimated that 6.8 million of the 8.3 
million tobacco-related deaths will occur.2  The changing global patterns of tobacco use that 
underpin these mortality trends reflect the presence and actions of the tobacco industry, 
whose role in expanding tobacco use globally,3-5 has led to its label as the vector of the 
tobacco epidemic.  
 
In recognition that the factors driving the tobacco epidemic, notably the actions of the 
tobacco industry, transcend national borders, the World Health Organization (WHO) used its 
treaty making powers for the first time in developing the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC). Given overwhelming evidence of the tobacco industry’s efforts to subvert 
public health policy making,6 the treaty includes Article 5.3, which requires parties to protect 
their public health policies from the “vested interests of the tobacco industry”.7 The FCTC, 
which is legally binding, entered into force in 2005 and, by December 2014, 180 of the UN’s 
193 member states were Parties to the Treaty. Yet FCTC implementation has been slow and 
uneven in large part because of tobacco industry efforts to subvert progress in tobacco 
control.8 
 
This paper provides an overview of tobacco industry practices focusing on LMICs given (a) 
the growing importance of LMICs to the tobacco industry’s future, (b) the increasing 
tobacco-related disease burden faced by LMICs9 which will increase the policy priority 
afforded to this issue, and (c) the potential, through effective tobacco control policy 
implementation, to prevent full escalation of the tobacco epidemic, particularly in Africa. As 
well as exploring tobacco industry market expansion tactics and policy influence generally, 
we examine in detail three mechanisms through which tobacco companies are increasingly 
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attempting to prevent progress in tobacco control - the use of international economic 
agreements, litigation and the illicit trade in tobacco. Tobacco companies are also exploiting 
the opportunities presented by harm reduction10,11 and regulatory developments such as 
Better Regulation to enhance their influence12,13 but these currently have less resonance in 
LMICs and are not, therefore, covered in detail. Finally, we outline how these problems 
might be addressed and highlight that, despite the egregious examples of industry influence 
detailed, some LMICS are exemplars in tobacco control and show what can be achieved by 
prioritising health over tobacco industry interests.14  
 
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY AND MARKET EXPANSION 
The importance of LMICS 
Tobacco industry conduct can be understood in the context of the global tobacco market 
and the growing importance of and opportunities presented by LMICs. Historically western 
based tobacco companies expanded their global sales by using investment and trade 
liberalisation to enter new markets and acquire smaller companies – Latin America in the 
1970s, parts of Asia in the 1980s and the former communist bloc in the 1990s.4,5 So 
assiduous was this expansion that the global industry is now dominated by just four privately 
owned transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) - Philip Morris International, British 
American Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and Imperial Tobacco(Table 
w1).15 While TTCs persistently seek to make inroads into the world’s largest and most rapidly 
growing market, China (Figure 1), it remains dominated by the state owned Chinese National 
Tobacco Company (CNTC), the world’s largest tobacco company by volume, which has 
fiercely guarded TTCs’ access16 and is instead emerging as a competitor, producing brands 
for export to South East Asia.17  Beyond this, there are now very few additional state-owned 
or private companies left to acquire (Table w1). 
 
Consequently, the TTCs’ future now depends on driving consumption and stretching profit 
margins in existing markets. With China largely closed to TTCs and consumption falling in 
most high income countries (HIC), Latin America and Eastern Europe, their main 
opportunities for driving consumption arise through promoting smoking in the hitherto 
underexploited markets of Asia Pacific, Africa and the Middle East, where consumption 
continues to increase (Figure 1).15 The greatest potential lies in Africa where the largest 
increases in smoking prevalence are predicted.18 Population growth15 and the burgeoning 
number of adolescents consequent to declining childhood mortality rates9 further enhance 
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the attractiveness of LMICs. So too do the limited opportunities elsewhere. In HICs, the TTCs 
have been able to increase profits despite declining sales19 by overshifting taxes (increasing 
prices over and above a tobacco excise increase)20. Yet this practice, on which TTCs’ share 
prices depend, looks increasingly threatened.21 Finally, the opportunities e-cigarettes 
present may be more limited than some had assumed - sales growth in HICs is already 
slowing22 and profits on e-cigarettes remain lower than on cigarettes with sales accounting 
for just 0.4% of total value in the combined, global nicotine and tobacco market in 2013.21 
Further, evidence suggests that the tobacco industry may simply seek to harness the 
reputational and access benefits of e-cigarettes while constraining their ability to genuinely 
compete with cigarettes.10,11 This is supported by media reports that tobacco companies are 
arguing for greater regulation of more innovative (refillable tank) e-cigarette products than 
cig-a-like products.23 
 
Figure 1. Cigarette consumption (millions of sticks) by region (historic and forecast data on 
retail volumes), 1998-2017 
 
Source: Euromonitor data downloaded 7th May 2014  
 
Market Expansion 
The tobacco industry’s aggressive approach to market expansion has been widely 
documented and shown to drive rapid increases in tobacco use.3-5,24,25  Historic evidence 
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shows that to drive up sales they market heavily, sell cheaply, systematically flaunt existing 
tobacco control policies and prevent future policies by lobbying aggressively.4,26-32 While 
such strategies are best documented in HICs, Latin America, parts of Asia and the former 
Eastern bloc, it is clear they are being repeated worldwide (Boxes 1 and 2).33-36 
 
Marketing  
Despite tobacco industry claims that it markets only to existing smokers to encourage brand 
switching, historical industry documents make it abundantly clear that they have 
deliberately targeted non-smokers, notably young people and women, and that their future 
depends on driving smoking uptake among these groups.24 For example, as one executive 
explained “[T]he base of our business is the high school student”,37 while BAT’s marketing 
plans for its brand Players Gold Leaf referred to targeting those aged “16+” and of “low 
income low literacy”.38  
 
The industry’s targeting of women in HICs dates back to the 1920s and linked smoking to 
emancipation, selling cigarettes as ‘torches of freedom’.24,39  Consequently the gender gap in 
smoking narrowed in most HICs, parts of Latin America and Eastern Europe, yet elsewhere, 
particularly in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, smoking among women remains considerably 
lower than men.40  Such tactics have, therefore, now been repeated worldwide with the 
industry capitalising on social and economic change by using marketing to make female 
smoking more socially acceptable (Box 1).24,39,41   
 
Box 1. Tobacco Industry Expansion into Emerging Markets: Targeting Women and Children  
Sub-Saharan Africa’s rapidly expanding young population and blossoming middle class 
makes it a prime target for tobacco industry expansion and tobacco companies have 
been strategically targeting the largely untapped opportunities there.   
 
Historical corporate documents indicate that the sale of single stick cigarettes, which 
continues to this day and makes smoking affordable and accessible particularly for the 
poor and young, underpins  industry expansion in Africa33,42,43 and efforts to ban their 
sale have been contested and circumvented.44,45 Numerous other efforts are made to 
market cigarettes to youth. In many African countries children aged 13-15 are 
frequently offered free cigarettes by tobacco company representatives.46 Recent 
reports document companies marketing candy-cigarettes near schools,42 and 
sponsoring youth-oriented concerts and events.47 Indirectly, youth promotion is also 
achieved through corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities such as publicly 
donating sickle cell anaemia screening machines in the Democratic Republic of Congo48 
where many children are affected by the disease, and sponsoring the education of 
hundreds of children in Uganda. 49 
 
7 
 
Marketing to women and girls who, in LMICs, have lower rates of smoking than men, is 
also widespread.50 51 Efforts include using ‘trend setters’ to promote and normalise the 
image of the African woman smoker (see below) in an attempt to mollify the cultural 
barriers to female smoking. The industry’s success is evidenced by the rising uptake of 
smoking in girls in many developing parts of the world.24  
                 
Congo Tobacco Company Celebration of Women in Goma, Eastern DRC, on Women’s Day, March 8 2012 
  
 
Evidence indicates a causal relationship between tobacco advertising and smoking initiation, 
and that even brief exposure to advertising has an impact on adolescents.52 The high levels 
of marketing observed across LMICs53,54 is therefore of major concern. For example, large 
numbers of children report being given free cigarettes by tobacco company representatives 
while the vast majority (between 35% and 97% by country) of professional respondents in 
schools believe the tobacco industry deliberately encourages youth to use tobacco.53 
 
Price  
Price/tax increases are the most effective means of reducing tobacco use.55 A key industry 
tactic in emerging markets, used as part of its aggressive approach to driving up sales, is to 
keep prices cheap in order to encourage uptake and establish use.15,56,57  Given the 
oligopolistic nature of most tobacco markets, only in some instances are such practices 
driven by genuine price competition.55 Dumping, price discounting, absorbing taxes rather 
than passing them onto smokers, using smuggling to avoid taxes (see below) and lobbying to 
keep tobacco taxes low have all been documented as elements of such a strategy.4,56,57 BAT 
has referred to this approach as “share at all costs market dynamics”.15 Once smoking 
uptake, tobacco sales and disposable incomes have increased sufficiently, the industry 
increases prices or encourages consumers to trade up to more expensive brands with larger 
profit margins; the aim as one PMI document explains, “to trade consumers up to premium 
brands as economies develop”.56  
 
Thereafter, as companies become more established in these markets, the extent of price 
competition weakens, enabling pricing above competitive levels and generating excess 
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profits.19,55 Evidence from as far afield as Ireland, UK, US, Jamaica and South Africa suggests 
that tobacco companies then begin to overshift taxes, ie increases prices on top of tax rises, 
at least on premium brands.20,55  This enables them to both increase profits and  pretend 
that the government, through tax increases, is solely responsible for the price rise.55 
Simultaneously they lobby for low tobacco taxes, arguing inter alia that price rises drive illicit 
trade. 58 59 Given that the industry itself is responsible for a significant proportion of the price 
increase, such arguments defy logic.20,59 What the industry is effectively appealing for is 
lower taxes so that it has greater scope to increase prices (and profits).20,59 This pattern, and 
the excess profits enjoyed by tobacco companies in such markets,19 instead signal scope for 
governments to further increase tobacco taxes, an opportunity that is frequently 
overlooked.20,59  Where governments have increased taxes, consumption has fallen and tax 
revenue increased simultaneously.55 
 
More detailed analysis shows that, while the overall pattern in established markets is one of 
overshifting, the tobacco industry simultaneously absorbs the tax increases on its cheapest 
brands to ensure their real price remains steady or even falls.20  These cheap brands appear 
to perform two functions – they provide a route into the market for price-sensitive (young) 
smokers and keep price sensitive (poorer) smokers in the market.20 Such efforts are 
combined with price-based marketing which has increased in importance consequent to 
restrictions on other forms of marketing and is also targeted at the least well off.60  
Collectively they undermine the intended impact of tobacco tax policy and are likely to 
explain inequalities in smoking rates.20   
 
INFLUENCING POLICY  
Political Influence in LMICs 
The evidence, including systematic reviews of tobacco industry political activity, indicates 
that tobacco companies predominantly use the same tactics and arguments repeatedly over 
time and across jurisdictions.34,58,61  Consequently, the existing literature, despite its 
predominant focus on HICs, can be used to anticipate and, therefore, counter industry 
activities elsewhere.34 The evidence also suggests some differences in approach, most 
notably that efforts to influence health policy in LMICs are bolder and, where possible, take 
advantage of state incapacity and corruption.41,62  
 
Overall tobacco companies continue to place considerable emphasis on economic 
arguments, rely heavily on third parties, and use litigation aggressively to weaken and 
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prevent public health measures.6,14,34,58,61,63 However, they have also adapted techniques to 
take account of both challenges to their political legitimacy, now formalised in Article 5.3 of 
the FCTC, and the opportunities presented by globalisation. For example, in response to 
their declining political legitimacy, they have increased their use of third parties64,65 and 
attempted to signify a commitment to the public good by rebranding their political activities 
as corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives66-69 and exploiting the political 
opportunities presented by harm reduction.10,11 In response to globalisation, tobacco 
companies are now actively using economic agreements and the opportunities presented by 
the global trade in illicit tobacco products to undermine progress in tobacco control. As 
outlined below, both efforts restrict informed scrutiny to experts - international lawyers or 
experts in illicit tobacco - and particularly threaten countries without the financial means to 
mount a legal defence or independently investigate the illicit tobacco trade and industry 
involvement therein.  
 
Misrepresenting the Costs and Benefits of Tobacco Control 
The tobacco industry tends to underplay the potential benefits of proposed policies while 
emphasising their costs.34,70 Consequently, despite the important work of the World Bank 
showing both the limited economic dependence of LMICs on tobacco and substantial 
economic benefits of tobacco control,71 the industry continues to exploit policymakers’ 
misconceptions of the economic importance of tobacco, limited knowledge of the socio 
economic benefits of tobacco control and short-term interests in revenue 
generation..29,70,72,73  
Its ability to do this is underpinned by efforts to shape understanding of the economic 
impacts of tobacco through the production of lopsided assessments of the economic 
benefits of tobacco designed to create what, in most cases, is a false choice between health 
and economic well-being.74-80  These reports highlight foreign exchange earnings, public 
revenue and employment associated with tobacco production (agriculture and 
manufacturing) and use (retail and hospitality), providing a foundation for alliance building 
with tobacco supply chain workers.79,80  Predictably, however, they ignore the economic and 
social costs associated with tobacco use and growing, the fact that money not spent on 
tobacco will be spent on other goods generating alternative employment and public 
revenue,71 and the potential for tobacco farmers, with targeted support, to diversify.81   
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A key audience for such efforts is non-health ministries, whose support is crucial to tobacco 
companies.14,63,82 Recent evidence from Vietnam indicates that concerns over 
unemployment and public and private debt in LMICs create a particularly receptive policy 
environment for industry arguments: officials from departments with interests in revenue 
generation took a “politics-as-usual” approach to tobacco control, characterised by a low 
priority for health reform and interdepartmental rivalry.73 This reinforces past studies 
focusing on African and Western Pacific countries.29,63 
 
Such efforts appear to enjoy particular influence in tobacco leaf-growing countries (Box 2).29 
Yet, it is increasingly apparent that much of the industry’s argumentation on tobacco 
farming is misleading.81 Claims that tobacco control measures in leaf-growing nations will 
suddenly decimate tobacco farming when the majority of the crop is exported and 
reductions in local consumption will be small and gradual are simply not credible.81 The vast 
majority of LMICs are not dependent on tobacco farming71 and economically sustainable 
alternatives have been identified in various world regions.81 While their application may be 
complex in some countries, perhaps particularly Malawi and Zimbabwe, the only two heavily 
dependent on tobacco for foreign earnings,71 continued dependence on tobacco also reflects 
political choices.  By refusing to sign the FCTC, countries like Malawi have cut themselves 
adrift from international efforts to find alternatives to tobacco through FCTC Articles 17 and 
18. Government inertia may also be explained by the dead hand of economic conflicts of 
interest; Malawi has many high-ranking government officials who grow tobacco.83  Serious 
concerns are also being raised about the industry’s treatment of tobacco farmers, with 
bonded labour and child labour key issues.81 In the absence of competition, tobacco 
companies have control over leaf grading and price, and can lock farmers into a repetitive 
cycle of debt in exchange for supplies.29,33 Consequently, tobacco farmers are increasingly 
supporting tobacco control and diversification efforts. In Uganda, for example, a group of 
farmers who had switched to growing alternative crops recently submitted a petition to the 
Speaker of the Parliament in support of the Uganda Tobacco Control Bill 2014, stating that 
“Tobacco growing is tantamount to making a contract with poverty.”  
 
Box 2. Tobacco Industry Influence in Emerging Markets: preventing, stalling and 
circumventing legislation in Africa 
Progress in tobacco control in Africa has been significantly hindered by tobacco industry 
interference. In Kenya, it took over 13 years for the Tobacco Control Act 2007 to be 
approved by Parliament and Namibia’s Tobacco Products Control Act, initially introduced in 
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the early 1990s, was not passed until 2010. These delays were attributed in large part to 
industry interference.33,84 In Nigeria, where tobacco control NGOs have pushed for 
limitations on tobacco industry involvement in policy-making, BAT Nigeria ran a full page 
advert in a July 2014 issue of The Guardian (Nigerian) attempting to undermine the NGOs by 
informing the public of the “aggressive propaganda against the Tobacco Industry” and 
claiming the industry had contributed to stronger tobacco control there and therefore “must 
be part of the solution”.85 In Uganda, where the Tobacco Control Bill was tabled in 2014, BAT 
claimed that the bill, although having little impact on demand for leaf which is almost 
entirely exported,86 would decimate the livelihoods of over 14,000 farmers with negative 
economic consequences.87 BAT initially cancelled their contracts with the 709 tobacco 
farmers from the constituency represented by the mover of the bill and later announced 
they would no longer contract any tobacco farmers in Uganda.45,87 While BAT has now 
blamed the bill for these decisions, it had previously cited the unpredictability of the tobacco 
crop in Uganda as the primary reason for withdrawal, while its 2013 closure of a leaf 
processing plant, relocated to Kenya, hinted that the company had been planning its exit for 
several years. 
 
Even once legislation is passed, the tobacco industry finds innovative ways to circumvent it. 
For example, in Kenya mandated health warnings on cigarette packages are often applied as 
removable stickers.33 In Nigeria, BAT has been accused of misleading senior police staff on 
the definition of “public places” in order to prevent enforcement of smoke-free legislation.88 
In Namibia, BAT used legal intimidation to prevent implementation of the 2010 Act.84  
 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
CSR is increasingly central to the tobacco industry’s business strategy, yet what appears 
under the rubric of this ill-defined term indicates that CSR is aimed at maintaining their 
status as political insiders with a legitimate role to play within health policymaking.15,66-68 
BAT documents indicate that these considerations have driven its CSR programmes from the 
outset: 
 
“The approach should succeed in hauling us closer to a position of co-operation 
with governments and other important stakeholders in the developed world, 
while helping to limit the spread of "demonisation" from the developed world to 
the emerging markets..”89 
 
CSR practices work politically by either facilitating conventional political activities (by 
generating goodwill amongst policymakers, for instance, charitable donations work to make 
access to political élites more likely) or creating alternative means of putting conventional 
political activities, such as constituency building and political access, into effect.,14,67-69,90,91 
Many initiatives do both by exploiting LMICs’ acute need for investment in social projects. 
Thus, BAT sponsored community water projects and PMI sponsored education projects in 
tobacco farming areas of Sri Lanka, East Africa and Colombia, for example, build and 
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maintain alliances with farming communities while simultaneously emphasising the value of 
the industry to social and economic development.67,92 This is taken to extreme lengths by 
aligning industry charitable donations with governments’ objectives of achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals in, for example, Nigeria and Brazil.67,93,94 Given the practice 
of LMICs defending tobacco on the basis of poverty alleviation and development, such 
approaches promise to be highly effective.95 Certainly, internal industry documents claim 
such activities enabled them to prevent advertising bans in Sierra Leone and Uganda, and to 
weaken a tobacco bill in Kenya.96 
 
Tobacco industry CSR programmes’ underlying narrative of co-operation and commitment to 
“sensible” regulation97 also provide a political lubricant for the industry’s other activities 
including the partnerships they are attempting to establish on illicit tobacco (see below). In 
Ecuador, for example, companies gained acceptance into policymaking networks by 
emphasising a commitment to regulation under the FCTC but then using the position to push 
for weak legislative proposals.72,75,98 These are designed to have a limited effect on tobacco 
consumption and, by filling regulatory space, decrease the likelihood of tobacco legislation 
being strengthened in the future.72,99,100 Continued industry demands to be part of national 
governments’ efforts to develop tobacco legislation97,101,102 underline the ongoing risk that 
such efforts pose to FCTC implementation. A similar strategy involves voluntarily introducing 
weak versions of FCTC measures with a view to preventing or delaying the implementation 
of comprehensive ones. In the mid-2000s, BAT increased the size of weak, text-only 
warnings on cigarette packs in Colombia, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Trinidad & Tobago, it 
then taking several years for these countries to eventually approve legislation mandating 
health warnings aligned with Article 11 Guidelines.103 
 
 
Constituency Building and Third Parties 
The tobacco industry makes extensive use of third parties to influence health policy in 
LMICs.34,61,75 Third party advocacy carries greater weight with policy élites,104 colours 
policymakers’ perceptions of the political risks associated with public health measures, and 
amplifies tobacco industry messaging about the negative impacts of policy, not least because 
news outlets frequently fail to expose the underlying financial conflicts of interest.105  
 
13 
 
Different organisations are used to manage different aspects of the regulatory environment. 
International business organisations, such as the US Chamber of Commerce and US-ASEAN 
Business Council,106 are used to lobby officials on the legal and economic implications of 
public health measures. For example, in 2013 and 2014 when Jamaica and Ireland, 
respectively, were legislating on tobacco packaging (Jamaica mandated pictorial health 
warnings covering 75% of the pack while Ireland aims to introduce standardised packaging 
of tobacco products), the US Chamber of Commerce wrote to both governments claiming 
the measures would contravene intellectual property obligations under international trade 
and investment agreements.107,108  The International Tax and Investment Center (ITIC), which 
describes itself as an independent clearinghouse for best practices in taxation is, as 
acknowledged on its website, sponsored by all four TTCs, which are also represented on its 
Board of Directors.109  It hosts seminars, publishes reports, and sponsors conferences on 
tobacco tax policy and the illicit tobacco trade which promote the tobacco industry’s 
position on these issues and give it “a seat at the policy-making table”.109 Such tactics have 
proved successful in influencing tax policies in some countries.109 In October 2014 it hosted a 
meeting for finance ministers the day before the FCTC Conference of the Parties meeting 
(COP) in Moscow where FCTC Article 6 guidelines on tobacco taxation were to be agreed.109  
Clearly intended to threaten progress of the guidelines, ITIC billed the event as a pre-COP 
meeting giving the impression that it was officially associated with the COP. This prompted 
WHO to write to all parties explaining that the meeting “is in no manner supported by the 
Convention Secretariat and cannot be considered as being in any way linked to the COP”.110  
 
The International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) was established and continues to be 
funded by the industry as a “front” for its “Third World lobby activities”.82,111 ITGA presents 
itself as the voice of the tobacco farmer in contemporary tobacco policy conflicts.112 Its 
financial links to tobacco companies are rarely disclosed111,112 although it is increasingly clear 
they use ITGA strategically to oppose tobacco control policies.82 Farmers are mobilised using 
misleading arguments about the impacts of policies82 and encouraged to intervene using a 
variety of means, including protests, media outreach, policy submissions and promotion of 
research, to highlight the negative economic impacts of public health measures.112,113  The 
tobacco industry has even managed to have ITGA oppose FCTC Articles 17 and 18 which aim 
to help farmers by finding viable alternatives to tobacco growing.82 Recently, civil society 
organisations and farmers groups in Africa have launched a campaign highlighting the ITGA’s 
lack of credibility and independence.114  
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The use of international trade and investment agreements and domestic litigation to deter 
and challenge progress in tobacco control 
The tobacco industry is increasingly using international trade and investment agreements, 
including those overseen by the World Trade Organization (WTO),115,116 and domestic 
litigation34,61 to challenge existing and deter future tobacco control policies.115,116  
 
Use of trade and investment agreements 
Industry documents suggest  argument that innovative health warning policies including 
standardised packaging contravened trade and investment treaties was developed as a 
deliberate strategy in the 1990s.115 Despite consistent legal advice that the agreements then 
in existence did not offer protection, the industry successfully used these arguments to 
deter policy implementation.115  With the growing number of bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties including the emerging Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(T-TIP) between the EU and US and Transpacific Partnership (TPP), involving 12 countries and 
approximately 40% of world trade, this trend looks set to intensify. Moreover, given changes 
in the nature of such agreements and evidence of industry efforts to influence their content 
in ways that make it easier to challenge policies, these agreements may now pose even 
greater challenges to tobacco control.116-118 Key concerns are that bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) enhance intellectual property rights and, in contrast to most current major 
economic agreements which only allow governments to lodge formal complaints, give 
corporations legal standing to directly challenge governments’ regulation though investor 
state dispute settlement (ISDS) arrangements. ISDS arbitration can be costly and uncertain 
and grants compensation (not sanctioned retaliation, like in the WTO), thereby significantly 
increasing the financial risks to countries facing such disputes.116,117   
Although corporations are unable to directly bring a case to WTO, certain LMIC governments 
appear willing to act as tobacco industry puppets.  Currently, five countries – Ukraine 
(DS434), Honduras (DS435), the Dominican Republic (DS441), Cuba (DS458) and Indonesia 
(DS467) – are complainants in a formal WTO dispute against Australia’s standardised 
packaging legislation.  These countries, alongside other (predominantly leaf-producing) 
LMICs, also challenged Australia for many months before the formal dispute within WTO 
committees119 and expressed concerns about the European Union’s Tobacco Product’s 
15 
 
Directive when notified to the WTO in 2013.120 Similar countries, Malawi among them, 
continue to vocally challenge other’ tobacco control measures in the WTO including bans on 
tobacco additives Canada and Brazil.121,122  
These disputes are rarely genuinely about trade. They are rather about the threat that 
regulation poses to tobacco companies and their ability to convince governments to 
challenge such innovation on their behalf.  In the case of standardised packs in Australia, the 
complainants’ do not export large volumes of tobacco products to Australia, if at all.123 
Instead, PMI or BAT funding for four of the five claims against Australia has been 
acknowledged.124,125  In Malawi, the tobacco industry is thoroughly integrated into official 
international trade policymaking – it plays leadership roles on the National Working Group 
on Trade Policy and the Private-Public Dialogue Forum.126,127  While the tobacco industry is 
clearly adept at cultivating strong political ties in countries where tobacco growing is 
widespread, it is also apparent that they take advantage of poor governance and corruption: 
18 of the 27 countries that directly challenged Canada’s ban on tobacco additives scored in 
the corrupt or highly corrupt range on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index, and  only 3 in the “Clean” range.128  
LMICs have also been the victims of industry efforts to use economic treaties to threaten 
innovative tobacco control policies both historically129,130 and recently.  Uruguay is currently 
defending its large, graphic warning labels in international arbitration.131 PMI (with 2013 
revenues of more than US$59 billion and profits near $9 billion132) claims that Uruguay (with 
total budget revenues of approximately $17 billion and expenditures of $19 billion133) is 
violating the provisions of a BIT that the country has with Switzerland (PMI’s corporate 
home), even though Article 2.1 of the BIT clearly provides for a public health exception.134 
Without an international NGO, Bloomberg Philanthropies, supporting its legal costs, Uruguay 
would likely have abandoned its regulatory efforts.135   
 
Use of Domestic Litigation 
Tobacco companies are aggressive litigants, bringing legal challenges even when their own 
advisers indicate that action is likely to fail,136 and reports suggest a fourfold increase in 
tobacco industry litigation against public health measures between 2005 and 2011.137  Such 
challenges seek to delay, overturn or weaken (allowing, for example, smoking in ventilated 
areas or limiting the size of health warnings (Box 3))138 public health measures. Amongst 
other measures, proposals in LMICs to increase the size of health warnings (Thailand,139 Sri 
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Lanka,140,141 Nepal142) and introduce graphic health warnings (Paraguay,143 Philippines1,144), 
and restrictions on public smoking (Uganda,138 Kenya,138 Mexico,79,145 Argentina,1,146 Brazil1), 
marketing (South Africa,138,140 Panama,1 Colombia1, Brazil1), and additives (Brazil147-149) have 
all recently been challenged in national courts. Interestingly, many of these cases fail,1,138,140-
142,150-152 reflecting a similar pattern in Europe.1,136,140  Given the frequency with which court 
challenges are made and the breadth of measures that have been subject to legal challenge, 
the number of informal threats of litigation to policymakers that never come to light but 
may have deterred progress in tobacco control is likely to be significant.34  
 
Box 3: BAT’s efforts to challenge health warning legislation in Sri Lanka 
In August 2012 the Sri-Lankan Ministry of Health passed regulations requiring pictorial 
health warning covering 80% of the front and back of tobacco packs and in February 2014, 
the Sri-Lankan parliament approved legislation to this end. Meanwhile, however, Ceylon 
Tobacco Company (CTC), a BAT subsidiary, has brought a series of legal challenges against 
the legislation that have led ultimately to a significant delay in implementation and a 
shrinking in size of the warnings to 60%.  
 
The initial lawsuit claimed the regulations were impossible to implement, the company 
would only comply if the requirements were “reasonable” (35% of the pack surface) and 
that the Ministry of Health did not have the authority to issue such regulations. The case 
went through several layers of the court system which at one point suggested that both 
parties settle with the Ministry of Health reducing the size of the warnings, a suggestion it 
refused, until CTC ultimately filed the case in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court first 
delayed implementation of the warnings before ruling, in May 2014, that the Ministry of 
Health had the right to impose the health warnings but ordered a reduction in size to 
between 50-60% of the pack surface. The new warnings were due to be in place by July 1st 
2014 but, just two weeks before that, CTC filed a further appeal with the Supreme Court 
requesting a 10-11 months extension to the date of implementation for the company to sell 
already available stocks. On July 11th 2014 a final ruling has delayed the 60% pictorial health 
warnings until January 1 2015. 
Sources:141,153  
 
Tobacco smuggling 
The availability of cheap, illicit tobacco undermines attempts to reduce tobacco use and is a 
public health concern which has prompted the inclusion of an Illicit Trade Protocol within 
the FCTC. Yet a far greater concern is the way the tobacco industry is increasingly 
manipulating the problem of tobacco smuggling for policy gain in ways that seriously 
threaten progress in tobacco control. Tobacco companies make their profit when they sell to 
the distributor and whether the cigarettes are then sold through legal or illegal channels 
makes little difference. However, the sale of cigarettes through illegal channels has a 
number of advantages for tobacco companies (Web Box 1). Despite overwhelming evidence 
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of the industry’s historical involvement in cigarette smuggling (Web Box 1) and growing 
evidence of ongoing complicity, for example through over-producing or over-supplying 
markets with product that then leaks into illicit channels,154-156 tobacco companies have 
managed to shift the illicit tobacco issue from a public relations disaster in which they were 
identified as the pariah supplier of illicit product157,158 to a public relations success story in 
which they are increasingly perceived as the victim of and solution to the problem. Through 
their assiduous efforts over recent years, tobacco companies have effectively hijacked the 
Illicit Trade Protocol (Box 4) and are actively using the threat of illicit to counter tobacco 
control policies by arguing, misleadingly, that tobacco control policies drive increases in 
illicit.58,59,159,160 
 
Tobacco companies have worked assiduously to achieve this position by taking advantage of 
the complexity of the issue and using their resource advantage to dominate every aspect of 
the debate.  First, by commissioning reports and surveys, tobacco companies have come to 
control the data and evidence on illicit and use this to dominate media coverage, secure 
access to authorities and promote industry messaging on illicit,161-163 for example that illicit is 
driven by public health policies rather than weaknesses in customs and law enforcement and 
that counterfeiting and intellectual property crime are the primary concerns.164  The volume 
of industry reports of this nature produced in recent years has been overwhelming, making 
it impossible for tobacco control groups to adequately respond. Where industry evidence 
and data from Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America and Australia have been examined, they 
have been found to be seriously flawed, to significantly exaggerate the scale of illicit (and the 
counterfeit element) and underplay industry involvement.154,161,163,165-170      
 
Second, tobacco companies fund activities under the umbrella of CSR (training for border 
patrol and customs officials, funding for sniffer dogs171-173) to further cement access and 
signal the need for “partnership” between industry and authorities.  These activities have 
enjoyed success as far afield as Azerbaijan, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, as well as at 
supranational level (Box 4).174 Consequently tobacco companies are now cooperating, both 
formally and informally, with various governments and intergovernmental agencies, 
contrary to Article 5.3.  Alongside extensive CSR efforts (see above) and claimed 
commitments to harm reduction (which have hitherto largely featured in HICs10,11), such 
efforts are undoubtedly intended to counter the TTCs’ gradual exclusion from the policy 
arena and undermine Article 5.3. More worryingly, if the norm of cooperation the industry is 
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seeking to establish in illicit trade seeps over into other areas of policy, it threatens tobacco 
control more generally.175 
 
Third, tobacco companies have been funding a growing number of third parties – 
organisations and individuals (notably ex-policemen) - who provide credibility and are 
deliberately used  as ‘media messengers’ or report authors, their links to industry rarely 
disclosed.176 The 2014 report produced by KPMG for the tobacco industry’s Digital Coding 
and Tracking Association (Box 4) and ITIC’s activities (see above) are just recent examples. 
Press coverage frequently fails to expose industry backing for these reports or their 
inaccuracy.162 
 
Collectively such efforts are enjoying considerable success and should be seen as part of the 
industry’s audacious attempt to secure control over the Illicit Trade Protocol and ensure it is 
put in charge of the global track and trace system that the protocol envisages as addressing 
global cigarette smuggling (Box 4).  Yet the danger of regulatory capture with the industry 
coming to control both the data on and how the illicit trade is dealt with is illustrated by the 
legally binding deals reached between the four TTCs and the European Commission, which 
growing evidence suggests have failed. While data show that genuine tobacco industry 
products are still being smuggled in significant volumes in the EU, the payments TTCs have 
had to make have been so tiny as to provide no effective disincentive.156,177 If a legally 
binding deal in a well-resourced jurisdiction has failed, this raises major concerns about the 
deals, binding and voluntary, negotiated elsewhere.  As experts note, no deal with the 
tobacco industry has ever led to a positive outcome for public health.174 
 
Box 4: The tobacco industry’s ongoing attempts to infiltrate and undermine global efforts 
to address cigarette smuggling 
The illicit trade protocol (ITP), a supplementary treaty to the FCTC, was adopted in 
November 2012 and puts technology, via a global track and trace system, at the heart of 
addressing illicit tobacco. It specifies clearly that the tobacco industry should play no part in 
such a system. Leaked industry documents show the TTCs had prepared for this by secretly 
developing a plan to promote Codentify, a pack labelling system developed and controlled 
by PMI, as the track and trace system of choice. Not only does Codentify not meet the ITP 
requirements for a track and trace system,178 but this would put the TTCs in control of a 
global system seeking to address the illicit tobacco trade in which they have been 
extensively involved. Further, it directly contravenes both Article 5.3 and the ITP’s 
requirement for the system to be independent of industry. 
 
In 2011 the four TTCs collectively established the Digital Coding and Tracking Association 
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(DCTA) in Switzerland to collaborate with governments and international organisations and 
promote Codentify, and PMI alone donated Euro15 million to INTERPOL, the world’s largest 
police organisation. By July 2012, DCTA had begun working with INTERPOL to make 
Codentify accessible to law enforcement agencies globally via INTERPOL’s Global Register. 
Subsequent to the donation, Interpol controversially applied for Observer Status at the 
November 2012 Conference of the Parties claiming its ability to coordinate and facilitate 
international cooperation to eliminate illicit trade would be an asset.154,164  
 
In 2014, the industry’s DCTA was a major sponsor of the World Customs Organisation 
conference on illicit tobacco in Brisbane, Australia. KPMG’s Robin Cartwright presented in 
DCTA’s timeslot but his presentation did not mention that he is leading a £10million project 
on behalf of PMI.154,179  Simultaneously, KPMG and GS1 UK launched a new report promoting 
Codentify.180 While this report acknowledges that KPMG has worked for the tobacco 
industry and cites funding from DCTA, it fails to note that DCTA is effectively the tobacco 
industry. 
 
As part of their apparent efforts to further ingratiate themselves with the international law 
enforcement community, in 2011 PMI donated 55,000Euros to the International Anti-
Corruption Academy,181 an organisation initiated by the European Antifraud Office (OLAF) 
and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)182 to provide anti-corruption education and 
research. 
 
THE WAY FORWARD  
 
Addressing tobacco industry interference should be simple. FCTC Article 5.3 guidelines 
outline the measures needed,7 technical reports flesh these out in detail,183-186 while this 
paper shows that industry tactics are repeated over time and place and could therefore be 
predicted and countered.34 Yet, while growing numbers of countries have taken steps to 
prevent tobacco industry interference, successful implementation of Article 5.3 is almost 
non-existent.174  
 
In practice, countering tobacco industry influence is complex.  Even where efforts have been 
made to implement Article 5.3, tobacco companies offset such efforts by expanding their 
use of third parties, changing the regulatory architecture in a way that cements corporate 
access and influence12,13,187,188 and influencing economic agreements to enable them to 
challenge policies.117 Tobacco companies will continue to secure access and influence as long 
as it remains acceptable to do so. A necessary first step, therefore, and a pre-requisite to 
advancing tobacco control, is to change attitudes to the tobacco industry. This requires civil 
society to actively monitor and publicise industry misconduct (as detailed in Article 5.3) and 
for ministries of health to help disseminate these findings within government and beyond. 
As tobacco companies spend millions each year attempting to rehabilitate their image189-192 
and as institutional memories are short, such efforts must be ongoing. It is no coincidence 
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that the countries (in all income groups) with the most successful tobacco control policies 
also have the most active programmes of industry monitoring (witness Thailand, Brazil, UK, 
Australia)14,193 and that recent progress in others has come in part though recognition of 
industry malfeasance and efforts to implement 5.3 (Box 5). While such efforts currently 
focus at the national level, industry influence also increasingly occurs at supranational level 
(the deals with INTERPOL, lobbying by ITIC and regional business organisations, for example). 
To address this, parties to the FCTC must cooperate, share knowledge, raise awareness 
among and hold intergovernmental agencies to account, and ensure that industry activity 
beyond national boundaries is monitored and reported. While WHO has a mandate to 
monitor the industry's supranational activity, funding for such efforts would need to be met 
by member states or international NGOs. Finally, TTCs’ HIC host governments should play a 
more active role in holding TTCs to account. In contrast to Switzerland (now home to two 
TTCs, PMI and Japan Tobacco International), the UK government (home to BAT and Imperial 
Tobacco) has made a start in developing guidelines for diplomatic posts.194 
 
Box 5: Progress in the Philippines 
In January 2013, after a hard-fought political battle against the tobacco industry (led by PMI) 
and its allies, and following active efforts to implement Article 5.3,183  the Philippines 
government implemented a major reform of tobacco excise tax structure and rates including 
hypothecating the tax for health purposes.  The reform sought to eventually eliminate a 
structure that favoured incumbent firms and kept taxes and therefore prices of tobacco 
products low. Though the country has long endured a reputation for poor governance and 
corruption195,196, governments can change. In this case, there was strong overt support for 
the reform from the highest political levels, including the President, the finance minister, the 
commissioner of the revenue authority and the leaders in both houses of the national 
legislature197,198 More importantly for countries seeking to replicate this success, the 
government successfully linked the reform strongly to health, both in terms of mitigating 
tobacco use but also by earmarking hypothecating the vast proportion of new revenues to 
providing universal health coverage to the country’s most vulnerable populations.  These 
linkages engendered widespread legislative and public support, which ensured the reform’s 
success.  As of mid-2014, early estimates suggest that tax revenues have increased and are 
going to the earmarked hypothecated programs, and smoking prevalence among the young 
and those of lower income are now declining.199,200 
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This approach does not overlook the fact that industry influence is a manifestation of the 
inequalities in power and resources between TTCs on one hand, and nation states and civil 
society on the other. This is particularly the case in LMICs. Instead it recognises that this 
resource imbalance can only be directly addressed through radical measures that curtail the 
tobacco industry’s excess profits19 or fundamentally alter its structure.201 The difficulties 
countries face in implementing even simple tobacco control policies underline that these 
more radical ‘endgame’ solutions, while much needed, are unlikely to be achieved without 
first changing attitudes to the industry through the actions above.   
 
Yet, while the ability of tobacco control policies to rapidly reduce non-communicable 
diseases in LMICs is widely recognised, the political complexities of implementing such 
measures are overlooked.9  The Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce 
Tobacco Use are exceptional in recognising this problem and supporting policy advocacy for 
tobacco control, including efforts to address tobacco industry interference. However, until 
this need is more widely recognised and tobacco control embedded more firmly in the 
development agenda, progress will remain slow. Economies of scale can be realised by 
collectively addressing the corporate vectors of NCDs, including tobacco, alcohol, processed 
food and sugary drinks, and the shared mechanisms (eg international economic agreements) 
though which their influence is mediated.202,203 Governments should also look to, polluter 
pays principles, hypothecated taxes or price regulation19 to fund these efforts. 
 
Governments and civil society must also look to implement other elements of Article 5.3 
(including limiting interactions with industry and ensuring their transparency, rejecting 
partnerships with industry, avoiding conflicts of interest for officials, denormalising activities 
industry describes as “socially responsible”). Most ministries of health are now cognisant of 
tobacco industry misconduct and the requirements of 5.3 and can therefore play a key role 
in informing other government departments. While departments seeking to control illicit 
tobacco may need to meet with and obtain data from the tobacco industry, they should 
ensure such interactions meet the standards of transparency required of Article 5.3 and 
learn to treat industry data with scepticism. Similarly civil society and ministries of health 
must urge governments to reverse any agreements tobacco companies have hitherto 
secured with governments. Prospectively, progress on Article 5.3 is likely to be enabled by 
first implementing the most feasible measures.  For example, many countries have codes of 
conduct for civil service to which guidance for interaction with the tobacco industry could be 
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added and provisions consistent with 5.3 can be added to tobacco control legislation as it is 
being developed. More broadly, improving standards of governance and transparency in 
policing making and public life and ensuring greater public health involvement in trade and 
investment agreement negotiations would help. 
 
Beyond this, a number of specific technical interventions should help address industry 
interference in LMICs and beyond. Technical support and capacity building is needed to 
enable parties to deal with legal challenges to tobacco control via both domestic courts and 
international dispute settlement mechanisms and is being addressed via the relevant 
knowledge hubs.204  Investigative research and capacity building in illicit tobacco is needed 
to further understand and address this complex issue. Updated research that directly 
addresses industry economic arguments, including those on tobacco farming, is also needed 
alongside efforts to accelerate the development of FCTC Article 17 and 18 guidelines on 
support for economically viable alternative alternatives to tobacco. Moving forward, LMICs 
must guard against industry efforts to alter the regulatory architecture, for example through 
the application of Better Regulation principles and business impact assessments, which have 
been shown to embed and enable corporate influence.12,13,188  
 
CONCLUSION 
Tobacco industry interference with governments’ efforts to implement tobacco control 
policies remains one of the greatest challenges to preventing the harm caused by this 
industry. Tobacco companies continue to promote their lethal product and circumvent or 
prevent development and implementation of effective tobacco control policies. While select 
countries in all income groups, including those where the industry is a significant economic 
player,193 show that actively addressing tobacco industry misconduct is achievable and 
enables effective tobacco control, elsewhere, despite a legal obligation to implement the 
FCTC, progress is lamentably slow and an epidemic that could be prevented continues to 
escalate. While debate centres on whether progress can be most rapidly achieved through 
implementation of FCTC provisions or moving to more radical ‘endgame’ solutions, actively 
addressing tobacco industry interference is a pre-requisite to both. Changing attitudes to the 
tobacco industry through actively monitoring and exposing its conduct is an essential first 
step. 
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